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31 
Looking Beyond the Negative-Positive Rights 
Distinction: Analyzing Constitutional Rights 
According to their Nature, Effect, and Reach* 
 




The relatively short catalogue of rights recognized by the 
Constitution of the United States, coupled with their near exclusive 
articulation as political and civil rights of a negative character 
opposable only to state action, has substantially narrowed the scope 
of analysis as to the different features and manifestations of 
constitutional rights in general.  This has led the debate amongst U.S. 
scholars to focus their attention to rights as a sometimes simplistic 
dichotomy between negative political rights on the one hand, and 
positive socioeconomic rights on the other, which are more typically 
found in modern, teleological constitutions. 
In this brief Article, I wish to challenge and transcend that 
narrow dichotomy and analyze the different variables applicable to 
constitutional rights, considering several interacting features.  First, 
the nature of a right, that is, whether it is civil and political or 
socioeconomic.  Second, the effect of a right, that is, whether it is 
negative rights that protect the titleholder against the actions of 
others or positive rights that entitle its titleholder to require others to 
act.  Third, the reach of a right, that is, whether it is vertical rights 
opposable to the state or horizontal rights opposable to private 
parties.  Finally, the titleholder of the right, which could be an 
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School); S.J.D. (Georgetown University Law Center). Associate Professor, Interamerican 
University of Puerto Rico Law School.  
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individual or a collective entity.  
These sets of variables demonstrate the potential multiplicity in 
terms of the actual articulation of constitutional rights. Rights come 
in all shapes and sizes.  This requires a more precise analysis of the 
different features mentioned above with greater care and individual 
attention, so as to better understand the different manifestations 
constitutional rights can take.  This can help us better understand the 
different uses of rights and, in turn, aid courts in their efforts to 
adequately apply these rights in a wide range of circumstances.  This 
discussion could also be helpful in the discussion about 
constitutional rights in general and the usefulness of post-liberal 
constitutionalism. 
One of the most enduring legacies of liberal constitutional 
theory has been the focus on rights as central to modern 
constitutionalism.1  While older framework constitutions normally 
give more attention to governmental structure and institutions, even 
they tend to start with the Bill of Rights and only later turn to the 
structural provisions.2 Teleological constitutions, that is, 
constitutions that focus more on substantive policy issues and goals, 
continue this practice of giving priority to rights.  The focus on rights 
is a shared feature of both liberal and post-liberal constitutional 
systems. 
The effect of this focus on rights has been so compelling that 
many actually believe that most of the substantive policy content of a 
constitution lies in its rights provisions.  If it is substantive in nature, 
it probably is a right.  This constitutes a true rights revolution,3 and it 
is a very individual-based approach to constitutional theory.  This 
logic has created an interesting, but not total, self-perpetuating cycle: 
Because most people believe that substantive provisions equal rights, 
constitution-makers do, in fact, articulate constitutional substance in 
the form of explicit rights, thus reinforcing the original view.  
Rights-centered constitutional theory is a mainstream view: “[the] 
 
 1.  See VICTOR F. COMMELLA, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS & DEMOCRATIC VALUES: A 
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 36 (Yale Univ. Press 2009); Daniel P. Kommers & Russell A. 
Miller, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht: Procedure, Practice and Policy of the German 
Federal Constitutional Court in CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 104 
(Andrew Harding & Peter Leyland, eds., Wildy, Simmonds & Hill Publishing 2009). 
 2. FERRERES COMELLA, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS & DEMOCRATIC VALUES 78, Op. Cit. 
note 1. 
 3. Víctor Ferreres Comella, Commentary: Courts in Latin America and the 
Constraints of the Civil Law Tradition, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1967 (2011). 
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protection of fundamental or human rights has been the central 
driving force behind the convergence on constitutional fundamentals 
since 1945.”4  A central doctrinal issue has been the scope and 
breadth of rights.5 
But rights are sometimes either bundled up together in a one-
size-fits-all descriptive model or characterized in necessary 
opposition to each other.  For example, as we will see shortly, many 
scholars tend to characterize, almost axiomatically, that, because 
civil and political rights are negative and opposable to the state, then 
socioeconomic rights must be positive rights that create an 
entitlement against the state.  Such is not the case.  The articulation 
of rights, even at the constitutional level, is far richer and complex. 
Classic liberal constitutions include the familiar list of (1) 
individual, (2) political, (3) negative rights (4) opposable to the state 
(vertical).  The U.S. experience has been one of negative political 
rights at the federal level.  State constitutional regimes are different, 
but have been the victims of a judicial approach premised on the 
federal model that have put those rights in a state of semi-
hibernation.6  As such, government action that infringes the freedom 
of speech, unduly burdens religion, unjustifiably discriminates 
against an individual or violates the protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures is found to be in violation of the Constitution.  
Courts as negative legislators that strike down government actions 
that infringe the Constitution take center stage in this approach to 
rights.  But the articulation of rights is much broader than negative 
protection against government action.  As we saw, there are multiple 
variables that, in turn, create a vast array of combinations that 
transcend the classic paradigm. 
The U.S. scholarship, as well as other scholars from the liberal 
democratic tradition, constantly fails to make these distinctions or 
take into account all of these variables.  For example, they always 
seem to equate, almost inherently, socioeconomic rights as positive 
 
 4. Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and the Reality of American Constitutional 
Exceptionalism, 107 MICH. L. REV. 391, 395 (2008). 
 5. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Australia: Devotion to Legalism in INTERPRETING 
CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 141 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 
2006). 
 6. “Although nearly two dozen state constitutions contain some type of affirmative 
guarantee of welfare rights, state courts are extremely reluctant to enforce those rights.” 
(Emphasis added.) Elizabeth Pascal, Welfare Rights in State Constitutions, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 
863 (2008). 
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claims upon the state with the corresponding budgetary and resource 
allocation problems which, in turn, fuels their apprehension for 
judicially enforced socioeconomic rights.7  This appears to be the 
result of an artificial dichotomy: since they are accustomed to 
political rights that are negative in nature, they assume that 
socioeconomics rights are positive.  They seem to be mirror images 
of each other.  But socioeconomic rights need not be positive and 
need not be only opposable to the state.  The idea that negative 
political rights are wholly enforceable while positive socioeconomic 
rights are not fails to distinguish between the multiple articulations of 
rights.  Let us take a closer look. 
 
A Closer Look at Rights 
 
 Rights According to Their Nature 
 
Here we focus on the content and substance of the right itself.  
As to this feature, we focus on the distinction between political and 
civil rights on the one hand, and socioeconomic rights on the other.  
Although historically different, for the purposes of this analysis, 
cultural and environmental rights are bundled up with their 
socioeconomic counterparts, as they share many of the same features 
as to their nature. 
 
Political and Civil Rights 
 
Examples of political and civil rights are freedom of speech and 
of the press, freedom of religion and association, criminal procedure 
guarantees, due process and the equal protection of the laws. 
These are the bread and butter of liberal constitutions.  They are 
considered first generations rights, precisely because, as a historic 
matter, they were the first to be adopted.8  One of the main purposes 
and functions of this type of right is to facilitate self-government by 
improving the proper operation of the structural machine created by 
 
 7. Herman Schwartz, Do Economic and Social Rights Belong in a Constitution?, 10 
AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1233, 1235 (1995) (describing the argument made against the 
enforceability of these rights). 
 8. FRANCOIS VENTER, CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON: JAPAN, GERMANY, CANADA AND 
SOUTH AFRICA AS CONSTITUTIONAL STATES 130 (Juta & Co., Cape Town, 2000). 
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the constitution.  It is because of that connection with the structures 
of government and the institutions of public power that we label 
them as political rights.  As a result, they are inherently connected to 
the concept of real citizenship and participation in the political 
process, hence their label as civil rights.  Because of this nature, they 
can be characterized as procedural.  Historically, these rights are 
associated with liberal political theory that focuses on the political 
liberty and empowerment of the individual citizen. 
Political and civil rights normally take center stage when a 
modern constitution is being drafted.  There are multiple probable 
explanations for this phenomenon.  First, their longevity.  As part of 
the first generation of rights, political and civil rights have been 
around longer than any other type of right, and so are almost 
automatic in any modern constitutional endeavor.  They have 
acquired sticking power and thus form part of most modern 
constitutions, whether liberal or post-liberal.  Second, they are 
essential to democratic self-government.  Political and civil rights are 
part of citizenship and, in turn, avoid a breakdown in the structure 
created by the constitution.  They are essential to the effective 
operation of democracy.  As a result, most constitutional designers 
recognize their vital role in making the constitutional structure work 
effectively.  Without these rights, the thinking goes, democratic 
politics are weakened and self-government is threatened.  Third, the 
dominant status of liberal democracy as the main political theory in 
the world today has an inevitable spillage effect over to 
constitutional design.9  Political rights are seen as a guarantor of a 
base core of individual liberty and autonomy central to the liberal 
tradition.  Yet, these rights have also been adopted by post-liberal 
constitutional systems that, while less individualistic in their 
approach, do share the view that political right are central to 
democratic governance and coexistence.  
The historically central role given to political and civil rights is 
partially responsible for the skeptical approach many scholars have 
to giving constitutional rank to nonpolitical rights: “And once a bill 
of rights is being framed or subsequently interpreted, there are 
 
 9. See Sujit Choudry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of 
Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 821 (1999); Sarah K. Harding, 
Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 409, 433 (2003); HANNAH 
LERNER, MAKING CONSTITUTIONS IN DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES 209 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 2011). 
2. Jorge M. Farinacci-Fernós- Negative-Positive Rights- Production Ready (1).docx 11/17/2017  12:40 PM 
36 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 41:1 
pragmatic reasons for focusing on more traditional civil and political 
right and leaving the existence or extent of positive social and 
economic rights to legislative discretion.”10  As a result, the inclusion 
of these rights in the constitutional text is a political necessity.  
Omitting these rights makes the constitution vulnerable to attack as 
to their commitment to individual liberty. 
Also, because of historical and ideological factors, civil and 
political rights tend to be of a negative character.11  In other words, 
that they protect against a determined action.  They are also typically 
opposable to the state.  But, as we will see when diving into both the 
negative-positive and horizontal-vertical dichotomies, political and 
civil rights come in all shapes and sizes.  Some constitutions have 
broken this classic and limited mold.  Yet, the (1) negative and (2) 
vertical articulations of political and civil rights are the main 
articulations in existence today.  As we just saw, ideologically 
speaking, these rights also tend to reflect an individualistic outlook, 




Examples of socioeconomic rights are right to a free public 
education, access to quality healthcare, and minimum wage or 
maximum hour provisions. 
These are the bread and butter of post-liberal teleological 
constitutions.  They are labeled as second generation rights.12  At a 
bare minimum, they continue where political and civil rights left off.  
In other words, they add to the list of rights that are necessary for the 
democratic process to work.  In that sense, they serve a procedural 
role along the same lines as political and civil rights: “Economic and 
social rights are inextricably intertwined with civil and political 
rights.”13  That is, they are partially premised on the notion that civil 
 
 10. Gardbaum, supra note 4, at 465. 
 11. Venter, CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON 12, Op. Cit. note 8. 
 12. Id. at 130; “[S]uch provisions are not found in traditional bill of rights, such as that 
of the United States.”  S.P. Sathe, India: From Positivism to Structuralism in INTERPRETING 
CONSTITUTIONS 219, Op. Cit. note 5. While socioeconomic rights are associated with more 
modern constitutions, Glandon explains that pre-twentieth century “continental European 
constitutions and codes acknowledged state obligations to provide food, work, and financial 
aid to persons in need.”  Mary Ann Glandon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 59 
U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 524 (1992). 
 13. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1242˗43. 
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and political rights are not, by themselves, enough to guarantee full 
citizenship and ensure effective democratic self-government.  It is 
enough to have the right to speak and worship; denial of an 
education, for example, as well as other basic human needs also 
weakens citizenship and effective political participation.  Yet, 
because they are socioeconomic in nature, they are better labeled as 
substantive instead of procedural.  Their substantive characterization 
is strengthened by the fact that their articulation is normally the 
product of policy judgments, as in the case, for example, of labor and 
employment rights.  In other words, they carry actual substantive 
content that reflects a policy choice. In that sense, they are not mere 
means to an end, but ends in themselves. 
Many socioeconomic rights come in the form of positive rights; 
many, but not all.  Furthermore, that typical characterization as 
positive is also accompanied by the label vertical.  In other words, 
that socioeconomic rights are positive rights that create an 
affirmative duty on the state.  For now it is important to separate 
these aspects: socioeconomic versus positive-vertical.  While in 
practice many constitutions do put them together, from a conceptual 
standpoint they share no inherent link and are not synonymous.  Like 
political and civil rights, socioeconomic rights also come in different 
shapes and sizes.  Unfortunately, many scholars still make reference 
to socioeconomic rights only as positive or vertical rights.14 
This seems to be the result of a U.S.-centered view where, as we 
saw, negative political rights opposable to the state are the norm.  As 
such, any alternative articulation must be its opposite, which is both 
conceptually and empirically inaccurate.  In fact, one would think 
that even an intuitive reading of the term “socioeconomic” would 
point to the private sphere, where most of economic activity takes 
place and where our social relation to the means of productions is 
established.  This is related to the vertical-horizontal dichotomy.  In 
addition, because constitutional rights are normally adopted to 
protect weaker groups, it would also seem intuitive that 
socioeconomic rights have a negative articulation, in order to protect 
the weakest members of society, like the poor or workers, against 
 
 14. See CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS: JUDICIAL ROLES IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 17 (Diana 
Kapiszweski, Gordon Silverstein & Robert A. Kagan, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, New 
York, 2013); Venter, CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON 130, Op. Cit. note 8; FRANCOIS 
VENTER, GLOBAL FEATURES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 84 (West Legal Publisher, Nijmegen, 
Netherlands, 2010). 
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powerful private economic forces. 
Aside from their procedural function, socioeconomic rights are 
the product of material inequality and the failure of democratic 
ordinary politics to solve that problem.  There is also a structural 
argument for socioeconomic rights: to protect vulnerable people 
from the failures of ordinary politics.  As to their substantive content, 
socioeconomic rights cover, at a minimum, basic human material 
needs, such as education, healthcare, food, housing and employment.  
If all else fails, a core minimum of sustenance is addressed, although 
that does not necessarily imply government guaranteed sustenance.  
Aside from the familiar list of healthcare, housing and 
education, there are other types of socioeconomic rights that must 
be mentioned briefly.  First, labor rights.  Almost by definition, 
these rights are mostly horizontal than vertical; that is, that they 
operate against private employers.15  This is crucial in the effort to 
widen our view of socioeconomic rights are merely a laundry list 
of entitlements against the state and the public coffers.  Second, 
even though some have characterized environmental protection 
provisions as belonging to third-generation rights,16 because of 
their similarity with second-generation rights, I think it is correct 
to include this type of provision within the socioeconomic rights 
family.17 
More than mere aspirational declarations, many of these 
rights are directly enforceable.  In these cases, the constitution is 
not just a mission statement but offers “substantive standards of 
social rights.”18  But even in situations where a right is not directly 
enforceable, it does not mean it has no role no play or that it has 
no legal significance or consequence: “Putting rights into a 
constitution, even if not judicially enforceable, is not an idle 
 
 15. See Pedro C. Magalhales, Explaining the Constitutionalization of Rights: 
Portuguese Hypothesis and a Cross-National Test in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF CONSTITUTIONS 441, Op. Cit. note 17; Helen Hershkoff & Stephen Loffredo, State 
Courts and Constitutional Socio-Economic Rights: Exploring the Underutilization Thesis, 
115 PENN ST. L. REV. 923, 929 (2011); Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional Adjudication in 
Europe and the United States: Paradoxes and Contrast, 2 INT’L J. CONST. LAW 1, 25 (2004). 
 16. Venter, CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON 131, Op. Cit. note 8. 
 17. Jeff King, Constitutions as Mission Statements in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 83 (Dennis Galligan & Mila Versteeg, eds., Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 2013); Pascal, supra note 6, at 863˗64. 
 18. Dennis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg, Theoretical Perspectives on the Social and 
Political Foundations of Constitutions in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
CONSTITUTIONS 12, Op. Cit. note 17. 
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gesture.”19 
Almost by definition, socioeconomic rights aim to protect weak 
members of society.  That weakness is not necessarily numerical, as 
in the protection of minorities.  The protected parties may by 
economically powerless and vulnerable to abuse by more powerful 
forces.  Yet, which socioeconomic rights are constitutionally 
protected is not universally established.  While there is a historical 
tendency in favor of progressive rights that typically protect the 
poorest and most vulnerable members of society, some 
socioeconomic rights can also include the property rights of less 
vulnerable groups.  But, more conservative property rights have been 
severely weakened during the last decades.20  Finally, some would 
say that property rights, as first adopted in liberal constitutions, are 
mostly seen – whether correctly or incorrectly – as more political in 
nature than as full-fledged socioeconomic rights.  This is related to 
the classic liberal view that property promotes individual liberty and 
autonomy.  Socioeconomic rights agree in part, but focus instead on 
the propertyless. 
Socioeconomic rights constitute the cornerstone of the 
substantive nature of post-liberal teleological constitutions.  When a 
constitution takes a position as to the importance, scope and effect of 
rights associated with education, health, labor and other similar 
matters, the constitution transcends its neutrality, takes a substantive 
position and molds the future development of society.  Even 
teleological constitutions whose only substantive features are its 
socioeconomic rights – that is, they are not accompanied by other 
policy provisions – those rights make all the difference as to the 
substantive nature of the constitution. 
There are many objections to the inclusion of socioeconomic 
rights in constitutions.  Most are premised on their positive and 
vertical versions.21  In these circumstances, the main concern is 
that the constitution promises that which the government cannot 
deliver.  When that happens, the constitution is weakened 
because there is a generalized sensation that one or several of its 
 
 19. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1239. 
 20. Gardbaum, supra note 4, at 396. 
 21. See Jon Elster, Clearing and Strengthening the Channels of Constitution Making in 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 28 (Tom Ginsburg ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
2012) (noting the issue of the economic viability of these types of provisions); Venter, 
GLOBAL FEATURES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 102, Op. Cit. note 14. 
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provisions become dead letter, which casts doubts on the 
authoritativeness and effectiveness of the entire constitution 
itself.  It is better, they argue, not to have them in the first place.  
This has also added to the view that, simply put, socioeconomic 
rights are not really constitutional rights: “Though many countries 
have included welfare rights or obligations in their constitutions, no 
democratic country has placed social and economic rights on 
precisely the same legal footing as the familiar civil and political 
liberties.”22  While I may disagree with the current universality of 
this affirmation, since I believe that some democratic countries have 
given some socioeconomic rights the same legal footing their civil 
and political counterparts, Glandon’s point is highly relevant as to 
the generalized problem of under-enforcement that results in under-
valuation of socioeconomic rights.  
The specific problem of judicial under-enforcement is 
reinforced by scholarly skepticism: “Until recently, most U.S. 
scholars placed socioeconomic rights outside the constitutional 
domain and beyond the enforcement power of courts.”23 This in 
turns facilitates courts from reading those provisions out of their 
constitutions.24  What is puzzling to me is that many modern 
democracies, even those that embrace the framework model, do in 
fact recognize and enforce socioeconomic rights, it is just that 
they are of a statutory nature.25  For example, labor laws in the 
United States that establish minimum wages, maximum hours and 
collective bargaining rights are all socioeconomic in nature, yet 
are easily enforced.  That is why some scholars have called for an 
adequate enforcement of these rights when they are given 
constitutional rank.26  In other words, it makes little difference as 
to the practical application of a right if it has statutory or 
constitutional rank.  If statutory socioeconomic rights are 
normally enforced, so should those same rights that are promoted 
to constitutional status.  As such, it would seem that the objections 
 
 22. Glandon, supra note 12, at 527. Pascal makes a similar argument: “Yet no 
Constitution places these rights on the same constitutional footing as civil or political 
rights.” (Emphasis added.) Pascal, supra note 6, at 884. 
 23. Hershkoff & Loffredo, supra note 15, at 925. 
 24. Pascal, supra note 6, at 863. 
 25. See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1243. 
 26. See Jeffrey Omar Usman, Good Enough for Government Work: The Interpretation 
of Positive Constitutional Rights in State Constitutions, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1459, 1517 (2010); 
Schwartz, supra note 7; Glandon, supra note 12; Pascal, supra note 6. 
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are more ideological than conceptual as to these types of rights. 
There are also objections to the judiciary’s institutional capacity 
and legitimacy to put these rights into effect.27  Our task here is 
simpler: to clarify the content, scope and reach of these rights so that, 
when the time comes, the goal of identifying an enforcement model 
is not thwarted by conceptual confusion. 
We must shed many of the prejudices and assumptions normally 
associated with socioeconomic rights.  It is an undeniable fact that 
they have become a generalized feature of many modern 
constitutions.  Bognador explains that today’s constitutions are 
“more than a mere organization chart.”28  Not only do they include a 
bill of rights that protects civil liberties, they “may also include a 
charter of social and economic rights, something characteristic of 
constitutions of the twentieth century.”29  Scholars like King make 
similar observations: “In more recent times, bills of rights have been 
quite expansive, embracing socioeconomic rights.”30  This requires a 
careful look at the different constitutions that are in existence right 
now, in order to explore what we might have missed.  The 
description of the South African Constitution’s recognition of 
socioeconomic rights as giving it an “unique character” is puzzling to 
me, due to the many other constitutions that do include these rights 
and put them in effect.31  Like their civil and political counterparts, 
socioeconomic rights have been on the rise for the past sixty years.  
They are less and less unique and more and more part of the 
constitutional mainstream. 
If the problem of socioeconomic rights is enforcement, then 
it is the duty of constitutional jurists to step up to the plate and 
propose solutions.  Yet, as we are about to see, negative and 
horizontal socioeconomic rights are quite easy to enforce.  This 
should represent a decisive blow to the enforcement-based 
objections to socioeconomic rights that were thought to be 
 
 27. Heinz Klug, South Africa’s Constitutional Court in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS 
307, Op. Cit. note 5; Hershkoff & Loffredo, supra note 15, at 934; Pascal, supra note 6, at 
863; Venter, GLOBAL FEATURES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 84, Op. Cit. note 14. 
 28. Vernon Bogdanor, Introduction in CONSTITUTIONS IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 4 
(Vernon Bognador ed., Gower, United Kingdom, 1988). 
 29. Id. 
 30. King 83, Op. Cit. note 17.  See also Glandon, supra note 12, at 523˗24; Schwartz, 
supra note 7, at 1233. 
 31. Klug 267, Op. Cit. note 27.  See also Venter, CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON 145, 
Op. Cit. note 8 (describing South Africa’s Bill of Rights as “avant garde” as to this issue). 
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inherently positive and vertical.  If many political rights are 
easily enforced because of their negative character – which we 
are about to see is not always the case, since, like with their 
socioeconomic counterparts, political and civil rights can also 
come in the positive and horizontal variety – then negative 
socioeconomic rights can just as easily be put into practice.  So, 
as to them, most objections again would seem to be political 
instead of based on constitutional theory.  If that is the case, we 
should not shield an ideological objection behind legal argument. 
 
 Rights as to Their Effects 
 
Here we focus on the uses of the right, that is, whether they 
forbid or compel action.  As to this feature, we focus on the 




These are the easiest to enforce, probably because it simply 
requires striking down the action that violated them. Simply put, 
negative rights protect us against something else. It basically acts as 
a shield.32  Negative rights are not inherently political or 
socioeconomic, nor vertical or horizontal.33  A shield can protect a 
whole host of rights and against a wide range of actors.  It can 
protect our political and civil rights as well as our socioeconomic 
rights, and it can also protect us against the state or against private 
forces or entities. 
The ease of enforcement as to negative rights lies in the lack of 
affirmative or creative remedial action needed for their vindication.  
If a local government entity censors a small newspaper and there is a 
constitutional right to free speech, a court need only invalidate the 
state action; if a group of workers goes on strike having a 
constitutional right to do so and an employer attempts to fire them, a 
court need only stop the employer from going forward with the 
disciplinary action; and so on. 
These examples illustrate the erroneous characterization of 
 
 32. See Harding, supra note 9, at 433 (referencing Canada’s Charter of Rights as 
limiting the power of the legislature to interfere with individual rights). 
 33. See Gardbaum, supra note 4, at 444. 
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socioeconomic rights as purely or even mainly positive rights in 
relation to their effect, and vice versa. For example, the right of 
workers to strike is a negative socioeconomic right.  Furthermore, it 
is enforceable against a private party, making it a horizontal as well 
as a negative socioeconomic right.  Negative rights have no 
substantive content, yet they give substantive provisions like 
socioeconomic rights greater scope and reach by transcending their 
generalized characterization as only entitlements that require 
affirmative government action and financial disbursement.  Negative 
socioeconomic rights do not require a direct disbursement of public 
funds, thus destroying one of the main argument against 
socioeconomic rights in general.  In fact, they can even cost less than 
positive political and civil rights.  As such, it seems that most of the 
cost-based objections to socioeconomic rights, as well as other 
competency concerns, are more adequately opposed to the notion of 
positive rights, whether they are political and civil or socioeconomic 
in nature.  As a result, negative socioeconomic rights should be 
exempt from these types of objections. 
The examples we just mentioned are a good sample of negative 




There are several examples of a positive right, some even found 
in U.S. constitutional doctrine, such as the right to access public 
information, jury trial and the right to counsel in criminal 
proceedings.  Other positive rights include a safe workplace and 
access to a free public education. 
Positive rights compel action.  Like negative rights, these have 
no inherent substantive content.  The compelled entity need not 
necessarily be public or related to the government.  Private parties 
can also be compelled to action.34  As to their specific articulation, 
Usman identifies five specific types: (1) authorizations to act, (2) 
non-justiciable positive rights, (3) non-self-executing rights, (4) 
highly specific enforceable provisions, and (5) abstract enforceable 
provisions.35  As to enforcement, all of these forms of positive rights 
 
 34. Id., at 441, noting that some rights “may, at least in principle, also impose positive 
duties on [private actors].” 
 35. Usman, supra note 26, at 1514. 
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have a role to play, from statutory construction to serving as 
authorization for legislative action. 
It should be noted that “not all positive rights are social or 
economic in nature . . . [they can also] involve protective duties 
respecting civil and political rights.”36  Also, “the converse is true: 
not all social and economic rights are positive rights.”37  This is key, 
because many times there seems to be an automatic correlation 
between positive and vertical rights, that is, obligations on the part of 
the state.  For example, Pascal states that “positive rights always 
require some type of affirmative governmental action.”38  If a private 
employer is required to offer its employees safe working conditions 
as a positive right of the latter, outside from the judicial enforcement 
element that would be present if the workers wish to vindicate that 
right in court, no additional affirmative government action is needed.  
This conceptual confusion has been problematic, because it has 
added to the notion that socioeconomic rights are inherently 
unenforceable: “Economic rights, so-called second generation rights 
such as healthcare, housing, education, etc. are the equivalent of 
positive rights, while negative rights include classic political 
freedoms, so-called first generation rights such as freedom of speech 
and religion.”39  While the list of rights used by Usman as an 
example of economic rights are, indeed, positive in their effect, we 
have seen that there are negative socioeconomic rights as well as 
positive political and civil rights. That dichotomy should be put to 
rest. 
The main problem with positive rights, whether they are 
political, socioeconomic, horizontal or vertical, is the issue of 
judicial enforcement.40  Positive rights are probably the greatest 
challenge for courts. As we saw, this challenge is separate from the 
general enforceability of socioeconomic rights. Even positive 
political rights are tricky to implement.  So, the issue is not the 
enforceability of socioeconomic rights in particular, but of positive 
rights in general.  When it comes to positive rights, a challenged act can 
 
 36. Gardbaum, supra note 4, at 445. 
 37. Id. 
 38. (Emphasis added) Pascal, supra note 6, at 865.  See also Usman, supra note 26, at 
1461. 
 39. Usman, supra note 26, at 1464. 
 40. Id., at 1491˗95; Allan R. Brewer-Carías, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS POSITIVE 
LEGISLATORS: A COMPARATIVE LAW STUDY (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2011). 
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be declared unconstitutional “not for what it provides but for what it 
fails to provide.”41 
The issue of the judicial enforceability of positive right has raised 
separation of powers concerns.42  Negative rights, whether political or 
socioeconomic, vertical or horizontal, fall easier within the traditional 
judicial function as negative legislators.43  While some negative rights 
have substantial policy implications, like a ban on privatizations of 
state-owned enterprises, positive rights have substantial governance 
implications.  When a court acts as a negative legislator, it merely has to 
strike down the challenged act.44  But when it comes to positive rights, 
the issue of alternatives as to remedies becomes trickier.45  The main 
point is that positive rights create an affirmative duty on whomever they 
bind.  But these difficulties should not be used as an excuse to undo 
what the people have decided: “The decision to include socioeconomic 
provisions in a state constitution [read: positive] thus is understood as a 
mandate to the legislature that narrows the scope of political 
discretion.”46  Courts should not be able to erase this constitutional 
mandate. As Pascal explains, “[i]f social rights are truly unenforceable 
[again, read: positive], they may be meaningless provisions in 
constitutions, or even undermine constitutional legitimacy.”47 
Finally, some scholars believe that “the difference between 
negative and positive rights has been overemphasized.”48  They point 
to the fact that some negative rights have “complementary positive 
 
 41. Tania Groppi, Italy: The Italian Constitutional Court: Towards a ‘Multilevel 
System’ of Constitutional Review in CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS 135, Op. Cit. note 1. 
 42. Pascal, supra note 6, at 864; Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1238. 
 43. Brewer-Carías 5, Op. Cit. note 40; Anna Gamper & Francisco Palermo, The 
Constitutional Court of Austria: Modern Profiles on an Archetype of Constitutional Review 
in CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS 34, Op. Cit. note 1. 
 44. Rosenfeld, supra note 15, at 5. 
 45. For example, some courts have adopted an approach based on giving the legislature 
wide deference as to the implementation of positive rights, especially as to the means to be 
used, limiting themselves to a reasonableness analysis of those actions.  See Gardbaum, 
supra note 4, at 452.  See also Usman, supra note 26, at 1495 (discussing that the “tendency 
of foreign judiciaries whose national constitutions contain affirmative rights provisions has 
been to avoid aggressive enforcement of such rights out of concern about distorting budgets, 
interfering with policy-making, and exceeding separation of powers limitations”). 
 46. (Emphasis added.) Hershkoff & Loffredo, supra note 15, at 929. 
 47. Pascal, supra note 6, at 864. Note the seemingly interchangeability of “positive” 
and “socioeconomic” rights. I think both Pascal’s and Hershkoff & Loffredo’s preference 
for the socioeconomic label is a testament of the current mainstream dichotomy that 
negative-equals-political-rights while positive-equals-socioeconomic-rights. 
 48. Pascal, supra note 6, at 866. 
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duties.”49  If this is true, then there is hope that all constitutional 
rights, independent of their nature and effect, are capable of being 
judicially enforced, even if using different standards of review.  As 
Pascal proposes, “constitutional rights create expectations that they 
will be judicially enforced if necessary.”50  When discussing 
socioeconomic rights, I objected to the notion that, for example, 
South Africa was singled out as one of the few systems that actually 
enforces socioeconomic rights.  Once we recognize the existence of 
negative or horizontal socioeconomic rights, we can find many 
examples of countries around the world that do have and enforce 
these types of substantive rights.  However, when we address the 
issue of positive rights of a socioeconomic nature, then South Africa 
does represent an island in an ocean.51  But that island is by no 
means alone; we just have to look harder. 
 
 Rights as to Their Reach 
 
Here we focus on the interaction of these rights, that is, against 
whom are they opposable.  As to this feature, we focus on the 




Examples of these are: freedom of speech and the right to a free 
public education. 
Simply put, these are rights that an individual has against the 
government.  In their negative form, verticality enjoins the 
government from encroaching a particular right.  In its positive form, 
it creates an entitlement the government must address affirmatively.  
In the beginning, most constitutional rights were vertical in their 
reach. This has structural and ideological explanations.  First, 
because the earlier constitutions were about government and not 
society, the rights contained in them only protected people from the 
state.  This is the social contract theory at work, where the 
constitution is a contract between the individual and the state. 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id., at 868. 
 51. “In many ways, positive rights litigation in South Africa has been an anomaly.” 
Pascal, supra note 6, at 889. 
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Therefore, the rights mentioned in the constitution only apply to the 
parties in the contract.  Second, there is an ideological motivation 
here which identifies the government as the main threat to individual 
liberty.  In order to protect that liberty, rights against the government 
must exist, especially those that have negative effect.  This is at the 
core of the liberal democratic tradition, which is why many 
structuralist constitutional systems require state action in order to 
enforce a constitutional right.52 
Positive rights changed this ideological view.  While still 
opposable to the state in their vertical articulation, by creating 
entitlements from the state, the government becomes a source of 
benefit and support instead of oppression.  This is also an ideological 
stance, which is why constitutions that include positive rights against 
the state, especially of a socioeconomic nature, signal at minimum, a 
social-democratic or post-liberal approach to public power.  “A right 
against” signals that the other entity in the equation may abuse its 
power.  “A right to” signals that the transaction to be had is 
beneficial. Like political and negative rights, vertical rights were the 
first born as to the issue of reach.  The state was the focus of these 




Examples of horizontal rights are privacy, minimum wage 
provisions, guarantees of safe working conditions, and so on. 
Not all sources of oppression and threats to individual liberty 
come from the government.  Powerful private interests also affect the 
daily lives of citizens. Horizontal rights apply laterally, that is, from 
citizen to citizen.  They are meant to shield against or create an 
entitlement opposable to private parties.53 
Although most of the rights found in classic structural 
constitutions are vertical, not all are.  For example, the abolition of 
slavery in the United States by way of the Thirteenth Amendment 
interfered with the relationship between masters and slaves.  Other 
framework-based systems have found that, while their rights are first 
and foremost vertical in their reach, there are spillover horizontal 
 
 52. Gardbaum, supra note 4, at 397. 
 53. Hershkoff & Loffredo, supra note 15, at 929 (The authors mention workplace 
conditions as a form of horizontal right.). 
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effects.  An example of this that courts will interpret private law 
through the prism of the corresponding vertical constitutional right.54  
For their part, teleological constitutions tend to include a host of 
rights that have express horizontal reach.55 
The right of privacy, for example, can be articulated to protect 
us not only against unwanted and unjustified government intrusion, 
but against nosy neighbors and abusive employers.  The protection of 
privacy rights, which are based on the existence on a minimum space 
of autonomy, can be just as important against the state as against 
private entities and even other individuals. 
 
 Rights as to Their Titleholder 
 
Here we focus on the bearer of the right, that is, who actually 
possesses it.  As to this feature, we focus on the distinction between 




Since the days of the early framework constitutions, the 
individual has been the main protagonist of the rights revolution.  
This reflects both a physical and ideological stance.  First, 
individuals are the basic unit of human existence.  Each person 
represents an independent component of the political community.  
Second, the individual as a political concept is the centerpiece of 
liberalism. 
Most rights belong to an individual.  Even if we are in a group, 
as it relates to rights, that group is merely a collection of individuals.  
When a particular association engages in protest, it is the members 
who have the right to protest, not the organization as a separate 





 54. Gardbaum, supra note 4, at 433; Venter, CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON 126, Op. 
Cit. note 8 (characterizing the approach in Germany as the “radiation effect” and in Japan 
the “spillover effect”). 
 55. See Klug, Constitutional Authority 280, Op. Cit. note 27. 
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Collective Rights 
 
But not all rights can be exercised by an individual. Some rights 
require the existence of two or more persons.  These are collective 
rights because they cannot be exercised by a single individual.  For 
example, in the labor arena, many constitutions recognize the right to 
engage in collective bargaining.  By definition, a single worker 
cannot engage in such type of bargaining.  For that matter, the right 
to engage in a strike or concerted activity requires the presence of an 
additional person. Collective rights are not the sum of your right and 
mine.  On the contrary, they are our rights, even if only one of us 
vindicates it in the judicial arena.  Some constitutions give rights 
expressly to groups.56 
 
It All Comes Together: The Multiple Manifestation of Rights 
 
A right can be classified by its nature, effect, reach and 
titleholder.  Its nature can be civil and political or social and 
economic.  Its effect can be negative or positive.  Its reach can be 
vertical or horizontal.  Its holder can be individual or collective. Each 
classification can engage with the other, thus creating a very wide 
range of possible rights articulations.  A few examples will suffice to 
illustrate these combinations.57 
-Negative, Political and Vertical: Freedom of speech 
-Positive, Political and Vertical: Access to public information 
-Negative, Socioeconomic and Vertical: Right to strike of 
public employees 
-Positive, Socioeconomic and Vertical: Universal free public 
elementary education 
-Negative, Political and Horizontal: Ban on slavery 
-Positive, Political and Horizontal: Religious freedom in the 
workplace 
-Negative, Socioeconomic and Horizontal: Ban on unjust 
dismissal in the workplace 
 
 56. Kommers 170, Op. Cit. note 1; Venter, CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON 131, Op. Cit. 
note 8. 
 57. For reasons of expediency, I did not use the individual-collective variable for these 
examples. 
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-Positive, Socioeconomic and Horizontal: Safe working 
conditions 
 Let us briefly examine these different articulations. 
The right of freedom of speech is an example of a political right 
that can be articulated to protect us against state action.  In that 
sense, it is political in nature because it is related to personal 
freedom and expression that is essential to democratic governance; it 
is negative in its effect because it shields the bearer against action 
generated by an external entity; it is vertical because, at least in this 
example, it is opposable to state action.  
The right to access public information is political because, like 
freedom of speech, it is essential to democratic governance. It is also 
normally opposable to the state, thus vertical in its reach.  But, unlike 
freedom of speech, this right compels government action, thus 
earning the label of positive. 
A constitutional right of public employees to go on strike is 
socioeconomic in nature, as it pertains to labor relations.  Because it 
deals with public employees, it is essentially vertical in its reach. 
Finally, because the right to strike shields employees from adverse 
action, it is mostly a negative right. 
The right to a free public education is mostly socioeconomic in 
nature, as it deals with an essential material human need.  It is 
vertical because, like in the case of public employees, public 
education is a matter of state concern.  Finally, like with the right to 
access public information, the right to a public education compels 
government action to provide one.  This, it can be characterized as a 
positive right. 
A ban on slavery guarantees a free citizenry.  This is a 
quintessential political right.  Since most slaves are owned by private 
persons, and not the state, its prohibition has horizontal effect and, 
because it prohibits action, it is principally a negative right. 
A constitutional right that recognizes freedom of worship in the 
private workplace is political in nature, because it goes to the heart 
of personal liberty.  It is horizontal because it is applicable to private 
employers.  Finally, it is negative because it shields the bearer from 
intervention against the exercise of the right. 
The right against unjust dismissal in the workplace is, like the 
one before, clearly negative in that it prohibits action, and is 
horizontal in reach because it enjoins private employers.  Yet, it is 
socioeconomic in nature because it protects the status of employment 
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and a person’s livelihood. 
Finally, we have the right to safe working conditions which, 
like in the case of unjust dismissals, is horizontal because it 
applies to private employers and is socioeconomic because it 
goes to the intricacies of the worker-employer relation.  Yet, it is 
positive in its effect because it requires action on the part of the 





Rights have multiple features and layers; they come in all shapes 
and sizes. In turn, these features can constantly interlock with each 
other, creating a wide range of possible articulations which are 
different from one another.  We have offered a few of those features, 
relating to the nature, reach, effect and title.  There may be more 
features and even more articulations within the feature I have 
proposed.  The point remains:  When it comes to constitutional 
rights, a broader look is called for. 
At the very least, I hope this allows a fresh look at 
socioeconomic rights and other policy provisions that are included in 
modern, teleological constitutions, particularly of a post-liberal 
nature.  By dissecting with greater care, we can be in a position to 
offer models of interpretation and application that allow greater 
judicial enforcement of these rights that have earned constitutional 
status.  It is up to us to find a way to make them become a reality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
